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    Locke on Personal Identity 
                            by Robert L. Latta 
   Although the first ten articles of Book II, Chapter XXVII of John 
Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding are not concerned 
specifically with the problem of personal identity, they must be understood 
if Locke's doctrine on that subject is to be fully grasped.' In these articles 
are to be found Locke's views on identity in general; these views include 
at least one insight which, I  think, has been ignored by some later philoso-
phers. Therefore, at the risk of seeming (which is to say, being) a little 
tedious, I will open my discussion with a consideration of these articles. 
   "That
," Locke says in Article 1 of Chapter XXVII, "that had one 
beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in 
time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse." To paraphrase 
this point:  Objects X and Y (where they are of the same kind, e.g., 
material  bodies) are the same object if they originated at the same time and 
in the same  place; otherwise they are different  objects. If this is a correct 
reading of the quotation, Locke clearly intends us to accept common time 
and place of origin as a necessary and sufficient condition of  X  and Y being 
the same object, provided  X and Y are the same kind of object and have 
origins. The reasons for the qualifications are as follows. (a) According 
to Locke, we can conceive God, and a finite intelligence, and a material 
body, i.e., one substance of each of the three kinds of which, he says, we 
have ideas, all existing in the same place at the same time. (b) According 
to Locke, God has no origin, yet is identical with himself. We know that 
God is identical with himself in the same way in which we know that a 
body which we see in a certain place at a certain time is identical with 
itself at that time. Finite intelligences and material bodies do have times 
 and places of origin; this establishes a connection between the present 
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topic and later discussion. See Locke's Article 2. 
   In Article 1, Locke gives an argument for the contention attributed 
to him in the last paragraph, one which it would be well to examine. It 
is impossible, he says, for two things of the same kind to exist in the same 
place at the same time, or for one thing to exist in different places at one 
time. If it be asked how we know the first of these things to be impossible, 
Locke's only answer in Article 1 is that we never find or conceive it possible. 
Likewise,  if it be asked how  we know that one thing cannot exist in different 
places at one time,  Locke's  answer is that when we see something at a 
certain time in a certain  place, "we are sure" that it is not  the same thing 
as that which we see at the same time in another place. 
   To spell out Locke's argument a little more  fully: If it is impossible 
for two things of the same kind to exist in the same place at the  same  time, 
then object  X, at the moment of its origin, could not have shared the 
place it occupied with object  Y (of the same kind as X), unless  X and Y 
were the same object. Hence, that  X and Y have the  same time and place 
of origin  is  a. sufficient condition of their being the  same object.  Moreover, 
if one thing cannot exist in two places at one time, object X could not  have 
been in two places at its moment of origin. Hence, that  X  and  Y  originated 
at the same moment in two different places  is .a sufficient  condition  of their 
diversity, and hence is a sufficient condition of  their lack of identity. 
 Now  let  us assume that one thing cannot have two different times of 
origin. Then X and Y  cannot be the same object if  they originated at 
different  times. But then, that  X  and Y originated at different times is a 
sufficient condition of their diversity, and hence is a sufficient  condition of 
their lack  of identity. The following four possibilities are, however, 
 exhaustive:  X and Y originated either (1) in the  same place  at  the same 
time, or (2) in the same place at different times, or (3) in different places at 
the same time, or (4) in different places at different times. But it follows 
from what has been said that in cases (2)—(4),  X  and Y are  not identical. 
Hence (a), where X and Y are of the same kind  and have origins, that they 
originated in the same place at the same time is a necessary condition of 
their being identical. But (b), it has already been  shown that this is a 
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sufficient condition of their being identical. Conclusion (a) cannot, I 
believe, be established on Locke's premisses without the assumption that 
I make at the head of this paragraph. This concludes my exposition of 
Locke's argument for conclusions (a) and (b). 
   I think that Locke could easily give a defense of the claim that one 
thing cannot originate at two different times, which would work just like 
 his defense of the claims that two  things  cannot exist in  the same place at 
the same time, nor one thing exist in two places at one time. That is,  he 
could say that we cannot conceive one thing originating at  two different 
times. This suggests to me a test like the following (though I will not 
claim that this type of test is demanded by the text). Picture to yourself 
an object X beginning to be, and an object Y beginning to be a little later. 
You must admit that you have pictured to yourself two different objects. 
So you cannot conceive an object originating at two different times. So 
no object can in fact originate at two different times.—This might make it 
a little clearer how Locke arrived at the premisses of his argument. The 
conceivability test of possibility has been used by a great many philoso-
phers, e.g., by David Hume. 
   This, I believe, covers Locke's Articles 1 and 2. In Article 3, he 
states that no action of a finite being, for example, a human thought, 
"considered as at different  times, can be the  same, each part thereof having 
a different beginning of existence." Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid 
evidently share this opinion. For they use it as a basis upon which to 
criticize  Locke's theory of personal identity, Reid saying, for example, that 
it is strange that Locke should make the continued existence of a person 
through time depend upon consciousness, which does not have such an 
existence. But this is jumping ahead. 
   An object need but exist, Locke appears to be saying in Article 4, in 
order to exist in certain (presumably identical or contiguous) places at 
certain (presumably successive) moments, one place to one moment, and 
so to exclude all other objects of the same kind from those places at those 
moments, and so, according to  'what has already been said, to be identical 
with itself as long as it exists. For this reason, he calls existence the 
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principle of individuation. I will not elaborate upon this argument; it 
involves, I think, the same types of considerations as does the argument 
which I have considered in detail. 
   When an object exists, then, according to Locke, and for as long as it 
exists, it is itself and  not another object. But we must be careful, he warns 
us, to what we apply this principle of individuation. That is,  we  must be 
careful what it is the existence of which is in question when we try to decide 
whether something observed (or considered as) at one time and place is 
the same thing as something observed (or considered as) at another time 
(and perhaps another place). 
   But this calls for elaboration. Consider an object the qualities of 
which are changing (and the location of which  is perhaps changing, too). 
Does this object maintain its identity? The answer would seem to be 
that in some cases it does, and in some cases it does not. A tree can grow 
and still remain the same individual tree. But it cannot be chopped into 
pieces and still be the same tree, although it might still be considered the 
same mass of wood as that of which the tree was made just before it was 
chopped up. Locke explains this in this way. The same tree exists as 
long as the same functional organization, which he identifies with the life 
of the tree, exists (see Locke's Article 5). The same mass of wood exists 
as long as the same particles of matter remain contiguous, however ar-
ranged. As the tree grows, the same organization persists; but it ends 
when the tree is destroyed, although the same mass of matter may still 
persist. So a tree can continue to exist even though it changes in certain 
respects, e.g., size; and a mass of matter can continue to exist even though 
it changes in certain respects,  e.g., the relative positions of its parts. In 
the former case, it is a functional organization obtaining among particles 
of matter, themselves more or less continuously being replaced by other 
particles of matter, the existence of which is in question. In the latter 
case, it is the existence of certain particles of matter in relations of con-
tiguity to one another  which is in question. 
   It might be asked under what conditions the functional organization 
of a particular tree continues to be the same functional organization. 
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Locke's answer, clearly,  is: as long as it exists. But under what conditions 
are we to say that such a functional organization continues to exist? These 
conditions, I would think (filling in for Locke), would be of this sort: 
(1) The particles of matter among which the organization obtains succeed 
one another continuously and gradually. (2) The organized mass does not 
disappear one instant and reappear the next instant somewhere else. (It 
must be the same mass to be the same organization at a given time. See 
Locke's Article 5.) (3) The organization, if it takes on new aspects in 
different periods of the tree's life, does so gradually, and takes on such 
aspects as are characteristic of trees in those periods of their lives. 
   Locke gives no positive indication, as far as I can see, that he would 
accept condition (3), i.e., that he would allow that the identity of a thing 
(e.g., a tree) can be preserved through changes in that (the functional 
organization of the tree) the continued existence of which constitutes the 
continued existence of the thing in question. But I do not think that 
anything he says definitely rules out his taking the view that such changes 
are allowable, i.e., that identity can be preserved through them. His 
phrase, "in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of 
plants" (Article 5), describing the way in which new particles of matter 
are united to a given living plant, seems favorable to my interpretation; for 
surely, a continued organization conformable to a certain sort of plants can 
take on new aspects as the plant grows older, especially when those new 
aspects are characteristic of the functional organization of older plants of 
that sort, and still remain the same functional organization. Moreover, 
the thrust of Locke's doctrine is that a thing need not remain absolutely 
unchanging in order to continue to exist, and therefore, in order to remain 
the same thing. So, it would seem, it would be (at least) unreasonable of 
Locke, it would constitute a denial of his basic insight, for him to insist 
that the identity of a thing cannot be preserved through changes in that (in 
the example used above, the functional organization of the tree) the con-
tinued existence of which constitutes the continued existence of the thing 
in question. 
   If my interpretation of Locke on this point is correct, then his insight, 
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I think, boils down to this. A thing may  undergo change, and yet remain 
the same individual thing, provided that the changes it undergoes are 
allowed for, so  to speak, in the concept of that kind of thing (as, for ex-
ample, increase in size is allowed for in the concept of a tree). This 
doctrine constitutes an answer to the problem of unity through change in 
 qualities: the problem how a thing can undergo change in qualities and 
still remain the same thing. I refer to this doctrine as an insight. That 
I think it is, a striking and important insight, one which, I think, has been 
ignored, or else not understood, by many philosophers who have come 
after Locke. (I would put Butler, Reid, and  Hume in this company.) 
The doctrine is a testimony to Locke's concern for the utility of concepts, 
a concern which shows itself in at least one  other matter to be discussed. 
But that is all the evaluation of Locke I will do for  the moment. (During 
this discussion, the problem of unity through change of  place has  been 
mentioned, but not attacked. Its solution would come, it appears to me, 
through the explication of Locke's argument at the bottom of page 3 above, 
which I declined to explicate.) 
   Before moving on  to  Locke's discussion of personal identity, I want to 
examine his concept of a man, for his contrast between a man and a person 
 (which, he admits, is not reflected in everyday speech) forms an important 
part of his discussion of persons. Important references to the idea of a 
man are made in Articles 7, 9, 10, 15, 21, and 29. I will take these refer-
ences in reverse order. In Articles 29 and 21, Locke's moderation has 
the upper hand; here he says that one's idea of a man may be  of (a) a 
 rational spirit, (b) a rational spirit united to a body that shows a certain 
organization of parts, or (c) a body that shows a certain organization of 
parts. In Article 21, he states that there is perhaps little agreement as to 
which  of these is a man; his concern here is with the consequences of 
adopting each definition. In Article 15, he states that the same body, as 
well as the same soul, goes  into the making of the same man, though the 
body, he says, is probably the overriding consideration for everyone but 
the man in question. In Articles 7 and 9, he appears to view a  man as a 
functionally organized, living body of a certain shape and constitution, on 
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the grounds that when we see such a body, we say "there is a man," whether 
or not there are signs of a reasoning power connected with that body, 
whereas, if we saw a body unlike a man's, and signs of a reasoning power 
connected with that body, we would not say "there is a man." In support 
of this latter contention, Locke goes beyond most modern ordinary lan-
guage philosophers in their own game, producing not just imaginary cases, 
but an actual case in which an author refers to a creature of which he has 
been told as a rational parrot, and not as a man in a parrot's body. Having 
made this appeal, Locke concludes (Article 10), "I presume it is not the 
idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in 
most  people's  sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it." 
   This does not,  I think, make  an entirely coherent picture. Never-
theless, I think that Locke's view can be summarized as  follows  : 
(1) One's idea of a man may be any one  of  (a)—(c) above. (2) According to 
everyone but the man concerned, it is the existence of the living body that 
constitutes the existence of the man. Therefore (I  think it is suggested), 
it would perhaps be best for everyone to  adopt  this criterion. 
   This brings us to Article  11a (as I shall designate the first of two 
articles marked  '11' in my edition) and Locke's definition of  'person.' He 
gives his definition of  'person,' he says, because, to find wherein personal 
identity consists, we must know what a person is. We can see why he 
says this. When we know the definition of a person, we will know, pre-
sumably, what it is that must persist over a given period for any person to 
be  identical  with himself over that period. 
   A person, Locke says in Article  11a, "is a thinking intelligent being, 
that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same 
thinking thing, in different times and  places; which it does only by that 
consciousness  which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, 
essential to it." What  does the first clause of this statement mean? If 
we agree not to talk metaphysics, it is quite clear what it means. We are 
all familiar with beings of the type described; for such are  most of the 
human beings we are acquainted with or have heard of. So, leaving met-
aphysics aside, we could interpret Locke to be saying that persons are 
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human beings of a certain type (excluding, e.g., infants, idiots, and certain 
of the insane), or creatures which we have never encountered, but which 
are like those human beings who are persons and unlike the rest of human-
kind in being rational and in being aware of having been in certain places 
at certain times, of having seen and done certain things in those places at 
those times, etc. 
   But in interpreting Locke's definition, we are not, of course, free to 
leave metaphysics aside. We must ask what that "thinking intelligent 
being" is, which, he says, is conscious of itself as itself in different times 
and places, and constitutes the self or person. In Article 27, he states 
clearly that we are ignorant of the nature of this thinking thing. In 
Article 25, he says that the more probable opinion is that the consciousness 
referred to in the definition "is annexed to, and the affection  of, one 
individual immaterial substance." This, then, gives us a significant part 
of our answer. According to Locke, the thinking being which is the self 
or person is probably an immaterial substance. But what else might it be? 
In Article 17, he clearly implies that it might be made up of spiritual or 
material substance, either simple or compounded. Also in that article, he 
refers  to the being in question in very broad terms as "that with which" 
the consciousness of the being which is presently the self can join itself. 
There are other clues as to what Locke means by "thinking intelligent 
being" in his definition of a person,  clues which may be found in Articles 
 10b, 12, 15, and 16. But as far as I can tell, the possibilities always boil 
down to two. The being in question, the self or person, is either a material 
or a spiritual substance. (Thus I agree, though with a little hesitation, to 
Butler's statement that  'being' in Locke's definition means  `substance.')2 
   But what, to wrap up this immediate topic for the  moment, is a spiri-
tual or a material substance, according to  Locke.?  A spiritual substance, 
he says in Book II, Chapter XXIII, Article 5, is that in which we suppose 
the operations of the mind to subsist, not being able  to  conceive how they 
 could, subsist alone, or in one another. A material  substance is likewise a 
substratum which, as we suppose, supports such a collection of simple 
sensible ideas as we call, for example, a horse. In other words, we use the 
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notion of substances to explain how the different operations of a mind, or 
qualities of an object, cohere. Perhaps this explanation is also supposed 
to cover the fact that such operations and qualities show a common 
ownership through time. Locke has been criticized for retaining the 
notion  of spiritual substance when, so the objection goes, he no longer 
needed it, having solved the problem of unity  through change in qualities, 
mentioned above. But more of this later. 
   I shall now  make an effort to discover what  Locke means when  he 
says,  as quoted above, that a person considers himself as himself in different 
times and places by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking 
and essential to it. I will do this by giving a series of quotations and 
explications. 
   Locke says that no one can perceive without being aware that he is 
perceiving, where perceiving includes such things as seeing, hearing, etc., 
meditating, and exerting the will. (This opinion has had many adherents.) 
"Thus it is always
," he continues in Article  11a, "as to our present sen-
sations and  perceptions  : and by this  everyone is to himself that which he 
calls self." That is to say, at any moment, it is in virtue of being conscious 
that one is perceiving, that one is the person one is, and not another. 
Moreover, it is in virtue of being thus conscious, that one knows that one 
is the person one is (for this explains the occurrence of the words "to 
himself" in the quotation). 
   Locke further develops his position in these  words  : "In this [con-
sciousness  that, one is perceiving] alone consists personal identity," and 
thus "as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
action or thought,  so far reaches the identity of that person." (See Article 
 1  la.) That is, since the consciousness one has of one's perceptions at 
any given moment is that  in virtue of which one is at that moment a person, 
 and  hence (since existence is the principle of individuation) is that in virtue 
of which  one  is the person one is at that moment, the extension of this 
 consciousness through time, so to speak, is that in virtue of which one is a 
person extending through time, and hence is that in virtue of which one is 
the same person at two different times. 
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 But now, it seems, we have to  figure. out  what is meant by the phrase, 
"the extension of  this consciousness through time ." Locke: says things 
in two  different'  places which can help  us. First (Article  10b): "As far 
as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action  with the same 
consciousness it had of  it  at first; and with the same  consciousness it has of 
any present  action;  so far it is the same personal self." Now in Article 13, 
he says that this "same consciousness" of which he speaks is  not "the  same 
individual  action" but rather "a  present representation of a past action." 
This  "suggests that  he  is thinking in the following terms. At  a certain time, 
a  rational being perceives  something (e.g., wills something, or sees some-
thing), and  this occurrence is (necessarily) accompanied by the  con-
sciousness that it is taking place. Later, that rational being represents to 
itself that past occurrence. But  this  it does by repeating the past perception 
in question (see Locke  on memory, Book  II, Chapter X,  Article 2). But 
then  a part of the  representation in  question is  (necessarily, I think) the 
representation  of the  consciousness that accompanied  it.  . If this is so, 
 then,  it  would  Seem, to say that the consciousness one has  of one's per-
ceptual (or  mental) activity  (including willing)—to say that  n  this, extends 
through time is to say that  one can represent to oneself,  by repeating it, 
that consciousness  whioh one had at one time of one's  mental activity at 
that time. It should be  noted, that only the possibility of representing 
one's past consciousness is in question; see the statement from  Article.  10b 
 quoted  at the head of this paragraph. 
   How, then, to  return to the question with which I started,  does  that 
consciousness  which is inseparable from thinking enable  ,a  person to 
 consider himself  as  himself in different times and  places? If  what  have 
just said is correct, then the answer is, clearly:  by  giving that  person.  the 
memory of having done and experienced such  and such. By that  self-
consciousness which  is essential to thinking,  'a person is aware that  he is 
having  the  perceptions he is having at a given moment. But  if  a person  is 
aware, at a given  moment, that  he is having the perceptions which he is 
having at that moment, then he will be able "(at least in  some  cases) to 
remember that he was having those perceptions,  by reproducing his 
 —  42  —
                                          Locke on Personal Identity 
original awareness of having those perceptions, with the additional per-
ception, that this is a past awareness. But if the present awareness  of 
having certain perceptions is to count as considering oneself as oneself 
now, this reproduced awareness must count as considering oneself as 
oneself in a different time and place. At least, it appears to make sense 
to read Locke in this way. 
   Let us note parenthetically that Locke, as in the passages just con-
sidered, calls the actions and  experiences of a person perceptions, and 
defines a person  as a thinking, as opposed to a thinking and self-moving 
being, or something of this sort. This would appear to indicate that deep-
down, he thinks of a person as a spiritual substance. 
   Since Locke takes the position that the ability  to remember is that 
which constitutes the extension of self-consciousness through time, it 
should be clear from what  has been said that by his doctrine, where a 
person has the memory  of having done or experienced something, he is 
the same person as the person who did or experienced that thing, and 
where he has no such memory, i.e., where he cannot remember having 
done or experienced that thing, he is not that person. Memory, then, by 
this doctrine,  is the necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity 
with respect to different times. 
   I here note, but will not attempt to lay out in detail, Locke's discussion 
of the relations that might possibly obtain between thinking substances 
(material and immaterial) and  that consciousness of one's perceptions 
which makes a being a  person.' This discussion takes up a large part of 
Chapter XXVII. Its outcome, as might be expected, is that whether or 
not this consciousness is or can be switched off, so to speak, from one 
thinking substance to another (if it can, several substances can correspond 
to one person), and whether or not one thinking substance can have, 
successively, two entirely different sets of memories (if it can, one substance 
can correspond to several persons)—whatever may be the case with regard 
to this, a person still extends through time to just the extent that his 
memories do. As to the possibility that a thinking substance may 
"remember" doing what in fact it didn't do
, and thereupon be unjustly 
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rewarded or punished, Locke says (Article 13) that we must trust to the 
goodness of God that this never happens. 
 `Person
,' Locke says in Article 26, is a forensic term. It plays a role 
in the allocation of praise and blame, punishment and reward. Thus, he 
says, it is applicable only to intelligent agents which are capable of hap-
piness and misery, and of living in accordance with a law (a law, perhaps 
he means, obedience to which maximizes happiness). In this statement, 
we can find a motive for Locke's definition of  'person.' For only a being 
which can remember having done such and such, and can remember having 
suffered or been made happy thereupon, can fruitfully be praised or 
subjected to punishment, etc. 
   A number of other philosophers likewise think of  'person' as a forensic 
term, i.e., as a term "pertaining to, connected with, or used in courts of 
law or [more generally,  in] public discussion and  debate."' Thus Leibniz 
says that the person subsists after death, retaining its moral qualities by 
conserving the consciousness of what it is, and thereby is rendered sus-
ceptible to chastisement or reward.4 Reid emphasizes the public aspect of 
 personhood (if I may use that term) when he argues that were an amputated 
limb a part of a person, it would have a right to a part of that person's 
estate, would be liable for a part of his engagements, and would be entitled 
to a share of the praise and blame due  him.' Persona, in Latin, appears 
to have referred sometimes to the mask worn by an actor in a dramatic 
performance, and sometimes to the man behind the mask.  'Person' 
itself has a similar range of meaning. It is sometimes used in treating of 
the man or woman, as when we use the expressions "in person" or "crimes 
against the person." But sometimes it is used in treating of the man's or 
woman's place or role in public life, as when we speak of legal persons, 
i.e., persons having legal rights and obligations (though a legal person 
need not be a man or woman). It seems fair to say, then, that those 
philosophers who, like Locke, speak or think of  'person' as a forensic 
term, have chosen to emphasize one major aspect, but not all major aspects, 
of the use of that term in nonphilosophical  discourse.' 
   It is clear, from the two preceding paragraphs, that what may be 
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called considerations of morality have an influence on Locke's account of 
personal identity. He wants the idea of a person to be that of a morally 
responsible agent. So, in his definition of  'person,' he establishes re-
quirements for being a person which are, he thinks, at least necessary 
conditions of being such an agent. Likewise, he appears to be influenced 
by what may be called considerations of immortality. For he points out 
(Article 15) that in accordance with his doctrine of personal identity, we 
can coherently conceive of the reidentification of persons at the resur-
rection, even if they have  bodies different from  their original ones, since 
the consciousness which makes a person is annexed to the soul, not to the 
body. Whatever else his bringing this up shows, he evidently is concerned 
that his account be conformable to Christian dogma. 
   Now I want to consider some criticisms of Locke's account of persons 
and personal identity. I will not present these criticisms in great detail, 
 since  my purpose is not to refute Locke, or to use him as a springboard to 
discussion of the problems he raises. I hope, rather, to indicate the 
directions in which a few of the more important criticisms of Locke have 
gone, or should, in my opinion, go; to bring out more clearly what Locke's 
doctrine is; and to point out, more or less in the manner of the preceding 
paragraph, several considerations that appear to have influenced Locke's 
account of personal identity. 
   Locke's general account of identity entails that a thing must continue 
to exist through time in order to be the same thing at two different times 
(I think the discussion on pages 3-4 above makes this clear). Now we 
have seen (page 9 above) that according to Locke, a person continues to 
exist through time in the sense that his consciousness of his actions and 
experiences extends through time; and a person's consciousness of his 
actions and experiences extends through time, according to Locke, in the 
sense that he can, at a given time, reproduce the awareness he had at earlier 
times of actions and experiences which he performed or underwent at those 
earlier times (a conclusion reached on page 10 above). But there seems, 
at least prima  facie, to be something wrong in this. For to be able to 
remember the actions and experiences which one performed or underwent 
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between a given past moment and the present,  which, according to Locke's 
 account, is to be able to reproduce one's awareness of these actions and 
experiences, is  surely not literally  to continue to exist from that past 
 moment to the present. Furthermore, as we saw (page 11 above), ac-
cording to Locke, that thinking thing which  is at present a given person 
might not be the same thinking thing  as'that thinking  thing which was that 
same person at an earlier time.  So there appears  to be an unfulfilled 
requirement within Locke's theory for something, the literal continuation 
 of which through time constitutes  the continuation of a  person through 
time. Something whose experiences, and whose awareness of its ex-
periences, could not be switched off to something else, might fulfill this 
requirement. Nor is the postulation of such a something as strange as it 
might sound. According to P. F. Strawson, the persons to whom we refer 
in everyday  speech, in the course of referring to  particUlar human actions, 
experiences, and states of consciousness, are just such  beings.7 But Locke 
appears too willing to allow that one thinking being might take over the 
memories of another to consider this possibility seriously. Moreover, 
the dualism of mind and body that Locke favors, which consists, basically, 
in the view that the mind of a human being is one  entity and his or her 
body a numerically distinct, i.e., a second, entity,  is inconsistent with the 
view that subjects of experience are Strawsonian persons, for the concept 
of a Strawsonian person is the concept of a single entity to which both 
predicates  ascribing' bodily attributes and predicates ascribing experiences 
are  applicable.' It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that Locke's dualism 
may have stemmed from his study of Descartes. 
   Butler, Reid, and Hume all deny Locke's contention, touched upon 
on page 11 above, that no  person did what he cannot remember 
 doing.' That is, they deny that the ability to remember is a necessary 
condition of personal identity. It can also be questioned whether this is 
a  sufficient condition of personal identity; for if it is, we are justified, 
presumably, in holding a man responsible for an action which he can 
remember doing, even though his body was not present at the scene of the 
 action.° Behind the first of these two objections lies the idea that there 
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is some other sufficient condition of personal identity than memory (for 
if there is absolutely no other sufficient  condition, the memory condition 
must  be necessary, if personal identity is possible  at all, and if  there is some 
other sufficient condition, the memory  condition, cannot  bd  necessary).:-.— 
and perhaps also the idea that there is  no necessary condition whatever of 
personal identity. 
   Now since Locke has disclaimed any intention of using  the term 
 `person' as it is used in everyday  spdech
,  having  put  his  account of personal 
identity only to the touchstone of utility,  I do not see how the objection of 
 Butler,  Reid, and Hume, the objection that memory is not  a- necessary 
 condition of personal identity, can  be sustained, except by showing that 
Locke's position is in  some way or other  ,inconsistent with the utility of the 
concept of a  person. I wish  to pass  over this whole matter  for the moment. 
As for the second objection, that memory is not a sufficient condition of 
personal identity, the way it has been stated, it  brings  out sharply the need 
to discover what Locke means by  'can' and by  'remember' when he says 
that person X is person Y if X can remember doing what Y  did. , 
 There are two senses of  'remember,' one strong and one weak (if the 
latter strikes one as a lexicographical  hoax, it can  still be regarded as a 
somewhat useful invention). In the strong  sense, if Bertrand Russell 
remembers writing Language, Truth and Logic, then he wrote Language, 
Truth and Logic. In the weak sense, if Russell remembers writing Language, 
Truth and Logic,  he sincerely  claims to remember (in the strong sense) 
having written Language, Truth and Logic, but he may or may not in fact 
 have written that  book.'1 Now when Locke says in Article 14 that if I 
remember performing any of the  actions,  of  Nestor (a figure in the Trojan 
War), then I am the same person as Nestor, he evidently is taking 
 `remember' in the strong  sense; for sincerely claiming to remember (in the 
strong  sense) having  performed the actions  of Nestor is not  a. sufficient 
condition of actually having performed them. But now there arises a 
problem. Taking memory as a  'criterion of personal identity, that  is, 
roughly speaking, as a mark or index that  we can use in deciding questions 
of personal identity, as opposed to a sufficient and/or  'necessary condition 
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of personal identity, how  can a person decide, in a particular case, whether 
his memory is deceiving him? Likewise, how can others tell that his 
memory claims are accurate? These questions bring out, I think, the 
dependence,  in at least some  cases; of the memory criterion upon another 
criterion of personal  identity  : that of bodily presence at the scene pur-
portedly remembered. I will leave this with the status of a suggestion. 
But if I  were to argue in detail, I would argue that the bodily criterion is 
at least as important as the  memory criterion. 
   Of  Course, Locke does not claim that I  must  actually remember doing 
something that  Nestor did in order to  be the same person  as Nestor. All 
that is  necessary is that I can or could remember doing what Nestor did. 
But what does this mean? That if I went through certain procedures, I 
 would remember? (And how could it be shown that I really did remember, 
 in the strong sense?) But there are no procedures which will enable one 
to remember any particular thing that he has experienced. Does it mean, 
then, that I am the one to whom it would be appropriate to apply memory-
reviving procedures?  But this seems just a way of saying that I did in 
fact do what I claim to remember doing. (And how can this be  shown?) 
These questions, I think, again indicate, though they by no means prove, 
that the memory criterion of personal identity stands in need of sup-
plementation. 
   Locke's apparent failure to see that the memory criterion most likely 
stands in need of supplementation, and his not distinguishing conditions 
from criteria of personal identity (an omission Reid blames him  for),12 
might well be explained, I think, if it could be shown that he takes memory 
to be an infallible mark of personal identity for the person concerned. But 
this I think he does. When he says, for example, that if I remember 
doing the deeds of Nestor, I am the same person as Nestor, by 
 `remembering' (i.e., by  'being conscious of'), he means having certain 
experiences (see page 10 above). But judging by the certainty which he 
evidently places in these experiences, it seems that he takes them to be 
infallible guides to truth. This view of memory would appear to be an 
extension of the view of knowledge as an infallible type of experience, a 
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view which has found many adherents throughout the history of 
philosophy, from Plato to Peter Unger. (There is, however, in Chapter 
XXVII, one clear exception to the claim that Locke takes memory to be 
infallible. He allows, as stated above (pages 11-12), that a thinking sub-
stance might "remember" what in fact it never did. My claim, then, should 
perhaps be restated as follows. Ignoring Locke's whole discussion of the 
possibility that one thinking substance might acquire the memories of 
another, there are indications that in Chapter XXVII, he takes memory to 
be infallible, or nearly so, not the least of which indications is that this 
makes his reliance on memory as the sole criterion of personal identity 
more understandable.) 
   Another classical issue, which I think deserves mention, emerges from 
criticism of Locke's position that the ability to remember is the sole cri-
terion of personal identity, viz., the problem how one obtains knowledge 
of himself, as compared with the way in which he obtains knowledge of 
others. Locke, as far as I can see, provides no way for another to learn 
about my personal identity, than through my telling him about my 
memories and present awareness of my perceptions. Reid, however, for 
example, says that we often judge of the identity of persons X and Y, seen 
at different times, on the basis of similarity of appearance.13 In view of 
the apparent need for the bodily criterion of personal identity, this might 
well be a justified procedure. I am quite sure, however, that Locke 
would not accept it. As I suggested on  page 7 above, it appears that he 
takes the position that identity of body is the criterion of identity for a 
man. But he distinguishes men quite sharply from persons, as can be 
gathered from what is said on pages 6-9 above. Now in his discussion 
of identity in general, it seems to me that his way of speaking suggests that 
there is only one criterion of identity for each kind of thing (e.g., for a 
living organism, this is maintenance of its functional organization). So 
if Locke views a person and a man as different kinds of things, and applies 
the bodily criterion to men, it seems unlikely that he would be willing to 
apply it to persons also. Moreover, if the subject of experiences is separable 
from the body, as Locke appears inclined to think, then the  bodily criterion 
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of personal identity certainly cannot be sufficient in itself, even supposing 
it to have any use at all under these conditions. 
   The questions which emerge from Reid's comment are, I think, these. 
Is there any basic difference between the way in which I know that I am 
the same person as person X, and the way in which someone else knows it; 
and if there is, does his knowledge still somehow stem ultimately from the 
same source as mine? I think that a thorough discussion of these questions, 
which I  shall not undertake, would bear importantly on the question of 
mind-body dualism, the nature of memory, and other topics central to the 
criticism of Locke's Chapter XXVII. 
   I undertook this brief discussion of the question of self-knowledge 
and knowledge of others under the heading of influences on Locke's 
account of personal identity. But perhaps I should say rather, I hope 
without unfairness to Locke, that the consideration of this question should 
have been more of an influence on his theory than it seems to have been. 
For I think that a more thorough consideration of this question than, by 
all appearances, he engaged in, might have led him to reflect more closely 
on the fallibility of memory, hence on the possible need for the bodily 
criterion of personal identity, and hence on his favored dualism (in the 
sense given this term on page 14 above), and on his apparent as-
sumption that each kind of thing has only one criterion of identity. (And 
then again, maybe not.) 
   Now I want to consider very briefly  Penelhum's argument that Locke 
has no need of spiritual substance, and therefore should abandon that 
notion, since he has given the correct solution to the problem of the unity 
of a person through change, to which the doctrine of spiritual substance 
is an incorrect  solution.14 I have, in effect, agreed that Locke has given 
the correct solution, in outline, to the problem of the unity of a person 
through change. That solution is to point out that a person can undergo 
change and yet remain the same person, provided that the changes he 
undergoes are allowed for in the concept of a person, as increase in size is 
allowed for in the concept of a tree. Hence I have, in effect, agreed that 
it is unnecessary, that it is, in fact, the result of a confusion, to postulate 
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the existence of something in a person which does not change, in order to 
explain the continued identity of that person through change. Moreover, 
what I here say I have agreed to with respect to persons, I have agreed to 
with respect to everything else. I only wish to point out the following. 
(1) My agreement is predicated on the correctness of my interpretation of 
Locke on pages 4-6 above, for if Locke will not allow, for example, that 
a tree can retain its identity through changes in its functional organization, 
then he has not really introduced any new solution at all to the problem of 
unity through change (he has then, in effect, simply reintroduced the 
notion of substance). (2) Locke will still have other uses for the notion 
of  substance, as long as he regards a mind as some sort of collection of 
ideas, and a physical object as some sort of collection of sensible qualities. 
   The question of the utility of Locke's concept of a person remains. 
For the sake of brevity, I here presuppose a great deal of the preceding 
discussion. My criticism of Locke in this respect proceeds, then, in outline, 
as follows. (1) Locke emphasizes only one of the major aspects of the 
use of the term  'person' in everyday speech, what might be called the 
legal or moral aspect. (2) This apparently leads him to give a certain 
purpose to the concept of a  person: roughly, that of aiding in the allocation 
of praise and blame, etc. (3) This in turn apparently leads him to give the 
definition of  'person' that he gives (see page 7 above). (4) The purpose he 
gives to the concept of a person, or the definition he gives of  'person,' or 
his assumption that there is only one criterion of identity for each kind of 
thing, or all of these, apparently lead him to contrast  'man' and  'person' 
sharply. (5) This in turn appears to lead him to overemphasize the memory 
criterion of personal identity. (6) This overemphasis, I think, is more 
indicative of the inutility of Locke's concept of a person than any failure to 
require the necessary and/or sufficient conditions of moral and legal 
responsibility in a person is likely to be, because the memory criterion will 
not in fact bear the weight that he places on it (see pages 15-16 above); 
but to employ the bodily criterion, he would have to revise his concept of 
a person, for this criterion cannot be applied to immaterial substances, 
nor is it, as far as I can see,  of great use if the soul can go from one body 
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to the next, carrying with it the consciousness which makes a person. 
(7) In view of the foregoing, Locke's solution might have been to emphasize 
also the other major role of the term  'person,' in which it means roughly 
the same as  'man.' While still retaining his interest in a person as a legally 
and morally responsible agent, he might have defined a person somewhat 
as is done on pages 7-8 above, and thus, perhaps, have avoided the 
difficulties mentioned under (6). 
   This concludes my section of critical comments on Locke's account 
of persons and personal identity. It is clear that these concepts have 
several important uses, and that their explication can be achieved only 
with the solution of a number of major philosophical problems. 
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